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1. Introduction 
 
The best-known theories of how dividend taxation affects dividend distributions and 
investment behaviour are the so-called ‘old view’ – see for instance Harberger (1962), 
Feldstein (1970) and Poterba and Summers (1985) – and the ‘new view’ – see for instance 
King (1974), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981). According to the old view, the marginal 
source of funds is new equity, and dividend taxation distorts both dividend and investment 
decisions. The new view, on the other hand, assumes that, at the margin, investment is 
financed by cutting (or postponing) dividend distributions. In this setting, a constant dividend 
tax reduces both the cost of the investment and the future return in the same proportion and 
hence has no effect on the firm’s cost of capital or dividend distributions.1 And, of course, a 
large number of alternative and complementary theories exist; these include the signalling 
theory – see for instance Bernheim (1991) – and the agency theory of Chetty and Saez (2007). 
 
These theories mainly deal with the long-run impacts of dividend taxation. In recent years, an 
interesting new literature has emerged, in particular the papers by Auerbach and Hassett 
(2007) and Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), which also encompasses the short-run effects of 
dividend tax changes.2 These impacts can arise if dividend tax changes are anticipated and the 
firm’s owners can therefore seek to minimise the tax burden over time, paying out extra 
dividends when the tax rate is low. Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) demonstrate that if firms face 
liquidity constraints, then an anticipated dividend tax increase, accompanied with above-
average dividend distributions, can also reduce investments even if the long-run cost of 
capital does not change. 
 
While the theories are well developed, there is still considerable uncertainty about the 
empirical magnitudes of these effects. Nonetheless, recent studies have successfully utilised 
policy reforms to isolate the causal impacts of tax changes. Such evidence is available  for the 
Anglo-Saxon countries in particular (see e.g. Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2007) for UK 
evidence and Chetty and Saez (2005) and Auerbach and Hassett (2007) for the US). The 
findings in Auerbach and Hassett and Bond et al appear to be more in line with the new rather 
than the old view, whereas Chetty and Saez (2007) argue that the evidence regarding the US 
                                                        
1 The ‘Nucleus’ theory by Sinn (1991) combines the views. 
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tax reform of 2003 is not readily compatible with either of the views. This finding is the basis 
for their analysis of dividend taxation from an agency point of view, where the asymmetry of 
information between the owners and managers of the company plays a key role. The existing 
evidence, in particular in studies aiming to find a causal impact of tax policy by studying tax 
reforms, is mainly based on the behaviour of large listed companies, where signalling and 
agency behaviour may indeed be very relevant. This also means that it may not be possible to 
arrive at a ‘pure’ separation of the old vs. the new view using data from listed companies. 
The present paper presents new evidence on the impacts of dividend tax changes on firm 
behaviour based on a corporate income tax reform that took place in Finland in 2005. This 
reform led, in particular, to increased taxation of dividends received by individual investors 
from domestic firms listed on the stock exchange.3 The taxation of dividends paid to 
institutional investors or foreign owners did not change. In closely held corporations, 
dividends up to a certain threshold level were kept tax-free. The 2005 reform therefore 
increased the dividend taxation of some, but not all enterprises, and the tax treatment was 
based on determinants, such as ownership structure, that were to a large extent exogenous to 
the firm at the time of the reform. This suggests that the reform involved sufficient exogenous 
variation in tax treatment, and it therefore opens up a promising avenue for empirical work. 
Our analysis is based on a large register-based data set covering all Finnish corporations. 
Thus the vast majority of our data is from small and medium-sized enterprises, where the 
main owner and the manager are often the same person. Therefore concerns about the role of 
asymmetric information between owners and managers or between firm representatives and 
investors are likely to be of less significance.  
An additional motivation for our analysis stems from the need to design the Nordic dual 
income tax in a successful way. While all dual income tax systems of this type share the same 
key features (progressive tax on labour income, flat tax on capital income), there are 
significant differences in the institutional details of the systems. In particular, the earlier 
Finnish tax system was seen to offer generous opportunities for shifting labour income into 
more leniently taxed capital income (Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg 2004), while the new 
Norwegian tax design is probably well sheltered against this behaviour (Sørensen 2005). An 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 For an early analysis of anticipation effects with policy uncertainty, see Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten 
(1998), who also examine the impacts of a rate-cut-cum-base-broadening tax change on investment behaviour.  
3 The combined tax rate on distributed profit rose from 29 to 40.5 per cent.  
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increase in the dividend tax can basically reduce the scope for income-shifting, but on the 
other hand it can have undesirable consequences on investments. Analysing the linkages 
between dividend taxation and investment is therefore also of key importance for the proper 
design of dual income tax, which is of interest per se because of the increased attention being 
paid to dual income tax systems worldwide. 
The analysis in this paper deals with differences in dividend payout and investment behaviour 
in the years following the 2005 reform compared to the years when the blueprint of the reform 
was not yet known (2000-2002).4 The reason for this choice is that we want to have a base 
year for our analysis that purely reflects the earlier tax system. In our companion paper (Kari 
et al 2008), we concentrated on the changes of the anticipated tax increase in the years 
immediately before the tax reform. There we documented a large increase in dividend 
payments by firms that were likely to face a dividend tax increase in the future. A similar 
pattern was found by Alstadsaeter and Fjaerli (2009) for the years preceding the new 
Norwegian tax system of 2006.  
The results in this paper, based both on regression-based differences-in-differences analysis 
and propensity score-matching, provide quite clear evidence that dividends declined in firms 
that faced an increase in dividend taxation.5 Since there was a large and anticipated increase 
in dividend payments in the years before the reform when the coming reform was common 
knowledge (Kari et al 2008), much of the response in dividends after the reform is likely to be 
due to intertemporal tax planning or, in other words, timing effects. There are few robust 
signs, however, that investments declined. All this is probably more compatible with the new 
rather than the old view of dividend taxation, and it also appears that, at the aggregate level, 
firms that faced a tax increase were not cash-constrained in the years following their extra 
dividend payments.6 
                                                        
4 Plans for the tax reform were unveiled in 2002 and 2003. Therefore dividend and investment behaviour were 
already affected by the anticipated reform as from 2003. 
5 While matching combined with difference-in-differences is often seen as a very promising estimator in labour 
economics applications (see e.g. Smith and Todd 2005), it has not been used to such a large extent in public 
economics. In that respect, one of the contributions of this paper is to narrow the gap in methods between these 
two areas of economics. 
6Our results, therefore, confirm the ideas in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) in respect of dividend payments, but not 
investment. However, the tax increase only hit relatively large, mature firms, where liquidity constraints are 
likely to be less severe. We would not want therefore to interpret these findings as a robust test of the 
implications of the Korinek and Stiglitz paper. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional details and the contents of 
the Finnish tax reform. Section 3 discusses the theoretical predictions regarding firm 
behaviour based in the short run on modelling of investment and dividend decisions and in the 
long run under a dual income tax system. Section 4 describes the data and our empirical 
strategy. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Finnish corporate income tax reform of 2005 
 
Dividend taxation before the 2005 reform 
Finland has applied a Nordic-type dual income tax since 1993, under which personal capital 
income is taxed at a flat tax rate and all other income (earned income) according to a 
progressive tax rate schedule. Prior to the 2005 tax reform the tax rate on capital income and 
corporate profits was 29 per cent7, while the top MTR on earned income was around 55 per 
cent.    
A full imputation system was applied to prevent the double taxation of distributed profits. 
This system led to a zero effective tax rate on dividends at the shareholder level, vbecause the 
tax rates on corporate profits and personal capital income were the same. Dividends from 
non-listed corporations, however, were treated differently. To avoid tax planning, induced by 
the wide tax rate gap between capital income and earned income, dividends from non-listed 
corporations were split into capital and earned income by categorizing capital income as an 
imputed return on the firm’s net assets and interpreting the residual of income as earned 
income. The proportion of dividends taxable as capital income was calculated as a 9.585 per 
cent return on the firm’s net assets.  
 
One notable element of the pre-reform system was the taxation of net wealth. Personal net 
wealth above a threshold of 185,000 euros was subject to taxation at a rate of 0.9 per cent. 
The tax base was fairly narrow, however. Most types of interest-bearing assets were exempt 
and only 70 per cent of the current value of shares in listed firms was reckoned as taxable 
gross wealth. This share was only 30 per cent for closely held companies.    
                                                        
7 The flat capital income tax rate was 25 per cent in 1993–1995 and 28 per cent in 1996–1999.  
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The 2005 reform  
The 2005 reform was the first major attempt to revise the tax rules for capital income since 
the tax reforms in the early 1990s, which introduced the dual income tax and the system of 
imputation credit. The 2005 tax reform lowered the tax rate on corporate profits from 29 to 26 
per cent and the personal capital income tax rate from 29 to 28 per cent. The most important 
change from the point of view of this study was the replacement of the full imputation system 
by a partial double taxation of distributed profits under which 70 per cent of dividends are 
included in the recipient’s taxable capital income. Another important element was the repeal 
of taxation of individual net wealth. This change was phased in as from 2006, one year after 
the other major changes.8    
The splitting of dividends into capital and earned income was maintained in the 2005 tax 
reform with some fine tuning, however. The rate of the imputed return was lowered to 9 per 
cent. One major exception from the overall approach of the new dividend tax system was that 
the capital income part of dividends from non-listed corporations was made tax-exempt up to 
90,000 euros. Any amount beyond that was taxed according to the main rule. The 70 per-cent 
rule was also applied to the earned income part of the dividend. 
 
The 2005 reform led to increased taxation of dividends received by individual investors from 
Finnish listed firms (Table 2.1). The taxation of dividends paid to institutional investors or 
foreign owners was not changed. In closely held corporations, dividends up to the threshold 
level of 90,000 euros remained tax-free. For those receiving dividends in excess of that 
amount, the reform led to increased taxation. The 2005 reform therefore increased the 
dividend taxation of some, but not all enterprises, and the tax treatment was based on 
determinants, such as ownership structure, that were to a large extent exogenous to the firm at 
the time of the reform. 
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Table 2.1. Dividend taxation before and after the 2005 reform 
 Previous tax system  2005 reform 
Tax rate on corporate profits 29 26 
Tax rate on capital income  29 28 
Top MTR  on earned income   55 55 
Splitting parameter (effective) 9.585 9 
ETR  on capital gains  12 14 
Method of dividend taxation  full imputation partial relief 
Combined tax rate on distributed profits: 
    Listed firms : 
    Non-listed firms  
        Capital income,   ≤ 90 t€ 
                                    > 90 t€         
 
29 
 
29 
 
 
40.5 
 
26 
40.5 
Tax rate on net wealth 0.9                0    (2006) 
 
 
3. Theoretical background 
 
This section discusses the changes in incentives to invest and distribute dividends caused by 
the 2005 tax reform. We first introduce three theories of the effects of dividend taxation: the 
old view, the new view and the irrelevance view, and discuss how these predict short-run and 
long-run behavioural changes. After that, we provide a more detailed analysis of the reform 
by studying the changes in firms’ cost of capital, first for closely held corporations (all 
corporations not listed on the stock exchange) and then for listed companies. Finally, we 
discuss to what extent our data and the 2005 reform can be used to assess the theories 
presented in this section. 
 
3.1 Alternative views of dividend taxation 
 
The old view of dividend taxation (Harberger 1962, 1966; Poterba & Summers 1985), 
assumes that the marginal source of funds to finance new investments is new equity issued in 
external capital markets. It predicts that dividend taxation raises the cost of capital and thus 
has a negative impact on investments, dividends and overall economic efficiency in the 
economy.   
 
The new view (King 1974, Auerbach 1979, Bradford 1981), on the other hand, assumes that, 
at the margin, investment is financed by cutting dividend distributions. Hence the firm’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 The 2005 rules for net wealth tax included some complex mitigations.  
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marginal source of funds is retained earnings. In this setting, dividend taxes reduce both the 
cost of the investment and its future return. If the tax rate on dividends stays constant over 
time, it reduces both the costs and revenues in the same proportion, and hence has no effect 
on the firm’s cost of capital or dividend distributions. The dividend tax terms cancel out the 
firm’s investment condition. So, while the old view has it that the burden of dividend tax falls 
entirely on marginal investment projects and thus raises the cost of capital, the new view 
predicts that dividend taxes capitalize into share values and leave the cost of capital intact. 
Observe, however, the assumption of a constant dividend tax rate (new view).  
 
The third key theory of the effects of dividend taxation, the irrelevance view (Stiglitz 1973), 
claims that, at the margin, firms finance their real investments with debt or by cutting their 
stock of financial capital. Due to the deductibility of interest costs in corporate taxation, the 
firm’s cost of capital corresponds to the interest rate.9 Corporate and personal taxes only fall 
on intra-marginal profits and leave the cost of capital unaffected.   
 
While the new and old views analyse firm behaviour in the steady state (mature firm), the so-
called nucleus theory, elaborated in Sinn (1991), expands the scope of the dividend tax 
theories to the birth and growth phases of a firm. It claims that the neutrality of the new view 
breaks down in the case of a growing firm, even if the marginal source of financing is retained 
earnings. It also claims that the cost of capital for the initial investment (the firm’s birth 
stage), financed with outside equity, is high much higher than the cost of capital of mature 
firms, as suggested by the old view.  
Recent research has discussed the implications of dividend tax theories in the case of an 
anticipated dividend tax change (Korinek and Stiglitz 2009, Auerbach and Hassett 2007 and 
Kari et al. 2008). Such tax changes induce firms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage by 
shifting dividend payments from high-tax periods to low-tax periods. The goal is to reduce the 
present value of the owners’ taxes. In the case of a future dividend tax hike, for example, 
firms will aim to benefit from the present low tax rate by increasing distributions before and 
reducing them after the tax increase. This short-run effect on dividends applies regardless of 
the marginal source of funds and hence under all the above three theories (Table 3.1). 
However, this shock slowly fades away and in the long run dividends return to their 
                                                        
9 This assumes that the corporate tax base before interest deduction equals the economic profit.  
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equilibrium level. Observe that for the old view this long-run level is lower than the original 
level and for the new view and the irrelevance view the long-run level is basically the old one.     
The short-run effect of an anticipated dividend tax cut on investment10 seems more 
complicated. Under the old view it is likely that a dividend tax increase leads to a reduction in 
investment both before and after the reform. The reason is that the tax increase reduces the 
present value of after-tax dividends regardless of the timing of an investment, before or after 
the anticipated reform. 
The new view basically predicts no change in investments after the reform but a decrease in 
investments in the anticipation phase. The reason for the latter outcome is that the tax increase 
reduces the present value of the after-tax dividend stream while the opportunity cost of 
investing is left unchanged. This increases the firm’s cost of capital and affects negatively the 
amount invested before the reform (Korinek and Stiglitz 2009). After the reform, the 
opportunity cost of investing also declines and the cost of capital returns to its original level.  
Under the tax irrelevance view the neutrality of dividend taxation in respect of investment 
applies both in the anticipation stage and after the reform. Investment is solely determined by 
the cost of debt, which is not affected by the tax treatment of dividends.  
Note, however, that if firms are cash-constrained, the extra dividends paid by the firms in the 
anticipation phase can lead to reduced investments during the anticipation years and, if the 
effect is very strong, also during the first years after the reform. This can happen both under 
the tax irrelevance view and the new view.11  
This discussion is summarised in Table 3.1, which summarises the predictions of the three 
theories for the short-run effects. The minus sign in parenthesis refers to the potential negative 
effects on investment in the case of credit-constrained firms.    
                                                        
10 The reform may affect investment not only through the firm’s cost of capital but also through second-order 
general equilibrium effects. We focus in this paper on the cost of capital effects.  
11 In the model by Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) investment opportunities are stochastic and due to capital market 
imperfections the firm holds cash balances to be able to quickly respond to investment opportunities as they 
arise. An increase in dividends as a response to an anticipated tax cut leads to a transitory reduction in cash 
balances and further to reduced investments until the optimal amount of cash has been restored through internal 
savings.   
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Table 3.1 Short-run effects of an anticipated dividend tax cut  
 Dividend   Investment   
 Anticipation stage After reform Anticipation stage After reform 
Old view + - - - 
New view + - - 0 (-) 
Tax irrelevance view + - 0 (-) 0 (-) 
 
 
In Kari et al. (2008), we observe a sizeable abnormal increase in dividends by firms which 
expected an increase in dividend taxation in 2005. The observation was interpreted as 
evidence of an anticipatory response to the reform. As regards investment, however, we did 
not find any statistically significant change in the anticipation phase. Hence when we focus on 
the behavioural responses of firms to the reform in the years after its implementation, we may 
expect to find a (short-run) drop in dividends regardless of which theory best describes 
behaviour. For investments the situation is different. While the old view predicts an 
unambiguous drop in investments, the two other views predict an unchanged level of 
investment if firms are not credit-constrained in the years following the reform. 
 
3.2 The effect of the tax reform on the cost of capital  
This section analyses the effects of the Finnish 2005 tax reform on the long-run cost of 
capital. The treatment is split into two sections because tax rules for non-listed and listed 
firms differ widely in the Finnish dual income tax system. Two alternative sources of finance 
are discussed: retained earnings and new share issues. The cost of capital for debt-financed 
investment did not change in the reform.    
 
Closely held corporations: the effects of the split model 
 
Under the Finnish dual income tax, all dividends received by individual shareholders from 
non-listed companies are subject to a split into capital income and earned income. Due to the 
tax rate gap between these income types, this system is likely to distort firms’ investment and 
dividend decisions. These special incentive effects are non-existent in the case of listed firms.  
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Hietala and Kari (2006)12 derive the following expression for the cost of capital of a non-
listed company:13 
(1)    rbap -= rKK )( , 
 
where p depicts operating profit, K is the capital stock, r is the gross real rate of return 
required by the owner and r is the splitting parameter that determines the maximum amount 
of dividends taxable as capital income. Any dividends in excess of that amount of are taxed as 
earned income.  
 
Assuming the “new view” case, under which investment is financed from retained earnings, a 
takes the standard form   
(2)  
)1)(1(
1
gf
c
tt
t
a
--
-
=  
where tc is the (proportional) tax rate on capital income, tf is the corporate tax rate and tg is 
the accrual effective tax rate on capital gains.   
 
If the firm’s distribution exceeds the maximum amount of dividends taxable as capital 
income, i.e. dividends are taxed as earned income at the margin, b takes the value   
(3)  
)1)(1( ef
ce
tt
tt
b
--
-
=  
where te is the marginal tax rate on earned income.  
 
Hence in (1) and in (2) and (3), the first term equals the standard-form expression of the cost 
of capital under the new view. The second term captures the special incentive effects of the 
Finnish DIT, produced by the tax rate gap and the method of calculating imputed capital 
income. For an owner with te > tc the second term br is positive and hence takes the firm’s 
cost of capital below its standard level. Observe that the term depends on dividend taxes even 
if the new view assumptions are satisfied.   
 
                                                        
12 Incentives in the Finnish tax system before the reform are also covered in Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg 
(2004). 
13 Here we leave aside the effect of net wealth taxation to simplify the analysis. For investors whose taxable net 
wealth exceeded the threshold this tax produced a small additional burden on equity-financed investment in the 
pre-reform tax system. 
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The 2005 tax reform mainly changed the values of the tax parameters but left the broader 
structure of the taxation of profits intact. Table 3.2 below shows the calculations made by 
Hietala and Kari (2006) on the cost of capital of non-listed firms in the old and the new tax 
system.14 
 
The figures show that in the case where dividends are taxed entirely as capital income 
(Section A), the reform slightly lowered the cost of capital. This decrease is the result of two 
opposing changes. The cut in the corporate tax rate reduces the cost of capital (equations (13) 
and (16) in Hietala and Kari), while the increase in the effective capital gains tax rate 
increases it. Observe that the dividend tax rules, including the 90,000 euro threshold, do not 
have any effect here. This is an implication of the new view. 
 
Table 3.2. Cost of capital for non-listed firms in the old and new tax systems (retained 
earnings)  
 
Dividends taxed at the margin as … 
B. Earned income 
Marginal tax rate on earned income 
Regime 
A. Capital income 
  
31.92 35.92 41.92 47.92 54.92 
4.4 3.8 2.9 1.8 0.32 
New system 
     £ 90,000 € 
 
     > 90,000 € 
 
 
7.9 
 7.5 7.0 6.2 
 
5.4 4.2 
 
Old system  8.0 
 
7.4 6.5 5.0 3.1 0.2 
 
 
In the case where dividends are taxed as earned income at the margin (Section B), the nature 
of the change depends on the owner’s marginal tax rate (MTR) te and also whether dividends 
exceed 90,000 euros or not.  The cost of capital decreases in most cases when dividends are 
                                                        
14 The calculations assume r= 7% and no inflation. The effective tax rate on capital gains tg is 12 per cent under 
the pre-reform regime and 14 per cent under the post-reform regime, calculated using the approach introduced in 
King (1977).  
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below the threshold and increases in the opposite case.  Observe that the cost of capital is very 
low, close to zero, when the owner’s MTR is high. 
 
We have thus far excluded the effect of the repeal of net wealth taxation as from 2006. This 
tax raised the level of the cost of capital by 0.4-0.6 per centage points if an entrepreneur paid 
this tax in the margin. So the effect of the repeal of the tax as from 2006 either made the 
reduction in the cost of capital larger or the increase smaller by the same amount.  
 
Let us next consider the incentive changes in the old view case, i.e. when an investment is 
financed by new share issues (see Hietala-Kari 2006, Table 7). The changes follow a fairly 
similar pattern in the case where dividends are taxed as earned income. The reform increased 
the cost of capital for firms above the 90,000 euro threshold and lowered it below the 
threshold in most cases. 
 
The main difference in the changes in the cost of capital between the two financing forms 
occurs when dividends are taxed entirely as capital income. The old view assumptions now 
lead to the outcome that the 90,000 euro threshold very much affects the level of the cost of 
capital. The parameters a and b of the cost of capital formula (1) are now 
 
(4)   
)1)(1(
1
df
c
tt
t
a
--
-
=  and b = 0. 
 
Where td  is the tax rate on dividends. It takes the value td = 0 under the old system (due to 
the full imputation credit), and td = 0 below the threshold (exemption) and td = 19.6% above 
the threshold (70% taxable at 28%) under the new tax system.  
 
Table 3.3. The cost of capital for non listed firms, dividends taxed as capital income 
              (new share issues)  
 
Regime Old tax system New tax system 
Div ≤ 90,000 € 7.0 6.8 
Div > 90,000 € 7.0 8.5 
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As Table 3.3 shows, the cost of capital is slightly reduced when dividends are below the 
threshold and the cost of capital is notably increased above the threshold. If we include the 
effect from the repeal of the net wealth tax, the reduction (≤ 90,000 euros) is 0.4-0.6 per cent 
points higher and the increase (> 90,000 euros) smaller by the same amount. 
 
Listed corporations 
For listed corporations the cost of capital follows from (1) with b=0 and a as in (2) in the new 
view case and as in (4) in the old view case. Table 3.3 calculates the change in the cost of 
capital using the same parameter values as above.  
 
Table 3.4. The cost of capital for listed corporations 
 
Financing form Old tax system New tax system 
Retained earnings (new view) 8.0 7.9 
New share issues (old view) 7.0 8.5 
 
 
3.3 Testable hypotheses 
Consider first non-listed firms. The differences between Tables 3.1 and 3.3 provide an 
interesting opportunity to test to which model actual behaviour corresponds more closely. For 
this, we first divide firms into two groups: those that distribute dividends at the margin as 
earned income and those who distribute dividends at the margin as capital income. For the 
first group, the tax reform moved the cost of capital in the same direction both according to 
the old and the new view. This implies that the behaviour of firms that distribute excess 
dividends taxed as earned income cannot be used to distinguish between the old and the new 
view.  
 
Firms that distribute dividends as capital income can be further divided into two groups: firms 
whose dividend distributions to the main shareholder are below the 90,000 threshold and 
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firms above the threshold. When dividends are below the threshold, there were no major 
changes in the cost of capital either in the old or the new view case. However, when dividends 
are above the threshold, the new view predicts that there were no major impacts in the cost of 
capital, whereas according to the old view the cost of capital increased substantially. This 
division can be used to separate firms into treatment and control groups. The treatment group 
consists of firms that distribute dividends as capital income and their dividend distribution is 
above the 90,000 threshold. All other firms are assigned to the control group.  
 
If the old view is correct, investments in the treatment group should decrease, relative to the 
control group, due to an increase in the cost of capital as a result of the reform. If, however, 
the new view or the tax irrelevance view is correct and the firms are not cash-constrained, 
investments should not decrease more in treated firms. Hence we should be able to 
differentiate between the old view and the new and irrelevance views if investments do not 
decline. However, we do not have the tools to infer which of the latter two views explains the 
outcome. And if investments are really reduced, this could in principle be due to the old view 
or severe cash constraints that the firms will still have after having paid extra dividends before 
the reform. Regarding dividends, we expect to see a short-run drop in dividends after the 
reform and we will not be able to use this information in differentiating between the different 
views.  
 
Consider finally companies that are listed on the stock exchange (Table 3.4). For all domestic 
individual owners, dividends became partially double-taxed after the reform. However, the 
dividend tax did not affect domestic institutional owners or foreign owners. This means that 
firms where most of the owners are domestic individual owners were more affected by the tax 
increase than companies with foreign or institutional owners. This means that the larger is the 
share of domestic individual owners, the more the cost of capital increased, , and therefore 
that the larger this share is the more investments should decrease. 
 
4. Data and the empirical approach 
 
The panel data employed contains information on the financial statements and taxation of 
Finnish corporations in the period 1999–2006. It was collected by the Finnish Tax 
Administration and is based on firms’ tax declarations. The data set also includes tax return 
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information on the principal shareholders of all dividend-distributing corporations. In 
comparison to similar studies that use smaller data sets, an important quality of our data is 
that there is no restriction on the size of the firm or the sector it operates in. However, since 
the tax increase only affected relatively large firms, we removed the smaller half of closely 
held corporations (that is, 50% of firms according to the total value of their balance sheet) 
from our sample to reduce the heterogeneity between firms that were affected by the tax 
increase and firms in the control group. The descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Our aim is to estimate the causal effects of a dividend tax increase on dividend distributions 
and investment. Since the tax treatment differs depending on the stock market status of firms, 
we examine listed and non-listed firms separately.  
 
Estimation strategy for non-listed firms 
 
Given what we know from Section 3, the idea is to investigate whether dividends and 
investments are lower in closely held corporations that faced a dividend tax increase in 2005. 
Since the tax increase is dependent on how much the firms pay out in dividends, firms can 
themselves influence their tax bill and thus their treatment status. To overcome this problem, 
we determine the treatment status based on pre-reform dividend levels at a time when the 
future tax details were unknown. Hence the firm is placed in the treatment group if it 
distributed a large amount (more than 90,000 euros) of normal dividends taxed as capital 
income before the reform. Otherwise the firm is placed in the control group. Using this 
strategy the treatment status is exogenous to the firms at the time of the tax increase. 
 
This idea is analysed by the differences-in-differences approach. We first use regression-
based differences-in-differences specifications of the following type (here for investments) 
 
 titititiiti aftergroupaftergroupXinv ,,,, * eghdba +++++= , 
 
where inv denotes real investments in firm i at time t, measured either as investments-to-
assets ratios or as the log of investments. The variable group is assigned a value of 1 if the 
firm is in the treatment group and otherwise 0, while after is a time dummy which is 0 before 
the reform and 1 after the reform. Our main interest is in the interaction of these two, the tax 
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increase variable group*after, which is 1 in 2005 for firms whose dividends, taxed as capital 
income, exceeded the 90,000 euro threshold before the reform, and otherwise 0.  
We also include a group of control variables, X. For the sake of comparability with the 
matching estimates (discussed below), the set of control variables is the same as those used in 
the matching procedure to explain the propensity score, and includes the number of 
employees, turnover, the total value of the balance sheet, the level of indebtedness, profits, 
and the third-order polynomial of all these variables. The constant is either the same for all 
firms or firm specific, depending on the specification. When we do not include a firm-specific 
dummy variable, the standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firms. When no firm-
levelfixed effect is included, we also include dummies for industry and region in the control 
variables. 
The identifying assumption is that, apart from the tax increase, all other factors that affect 
investment behaviour stay constant over time, so that these unobservable factors can be 
captured by firm or group-level fixed effects. While unobservable factors can always be 
present, we are not aware of any other reasons why investment behaviour might change over 
these years differently for firms in different groups. The fact that we can separate firms 
depending both on their ownership status and the level of dividend payments implies that in 
our empirical strategy we can control for more differences among firms than is usually the 
case in empirical tax analysis. This, in our view, increases confidence in interpreting the 
estimates as causal effects.  
To further reduce the scope for other potential differences between treated and non-treated 
firms, we combine propensity score matching with the difference-in-differences analysis, 
inspired by the ideas of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997).15 The benefit of this method is 
that it makes the treated firms and the control group firms as similar as possible in terms of 
the observable variables, which is likely to be important in our case, since the size of the firms 
in the control group is on average much smaller than the size of the treated firms.  
In this method, we match firms according to their pre-reform observable variables and then 
examine if the change in investments differs between matched pairs of treated and non-treated 
                                                        
15 For an intuitive overview of matching methods, see e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). 
 17 
firms. In more formal terms, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as 
follows: 
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where TN  is the number of units in the treatment group, T refers to the treatment group and C 
to the control group, and S  denotes the region of common support (see below). The estimator 
compares the change in the outcome variable, here investment in treated firms, from the pre 
(time t-1) to the post-reform (time t) period, 1)0()1( -- itit invinv , and to the weighted 
corresponding change in the control group, ( )å
ÇÎ
--
PSCj
jtjtij invinv 1)0()0(w .  Here 0 refers to a 
situation with no tax increase and 1 to the outcome with the tax increase, and w  denotes the 
weight used for the control group observations.  
 
The weights are determined on the basis of propensity score estimates. The idea is to explain 
the propensity score, i.e. the probability of facing a tax increase (in this case, that dividend 
payments are above the taxable threshold before the reform), with a set of observable 
variables. We use a probit regression to explain this probability using pre-reform values of the 
following variables: number of employees, turnover, total value of the balance sheet, level of 
indebtedness, and profits, and the third-order polynomial of all these variables. We use both 
nearest neighbour and kernel matching, using in the former case one nearest neighbour and in 
the latter case the Epanechnikov kernel. With nearest neighbour matching, each treated firm is 
matched with one firm from the control group with the nearest value for the propensity score. 
In the case of kernel matching, a number of control group firms are used as a comparison with 
each treated firm. These control group firms come from a certain area with the values of the 
propensity score close enough to the corresponding value for the treated firm. This area is 
called the bandwidth, and we also conduct sensitivity analysis in respect of the bandwidth in 
kernel matching. Within the bandwidth, firms closest to the treated firm, in terms of the 
propensity score value, get the highest weight. 
 
The common support assumption (that only firms that have the characteristics of X that are 
simultaneously observed for both treated and control firms are compared) is invoked. As 
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usual, the standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. Tests of how well matching 
succeeded are also provided.  
 
Because the outcome variable is the change in investment, we can allow for time-invariant 
differences in levels of investment between firms in the treatment and the control groups. But 
of course we need to assume, as in the regression-based difference-in-differences analysis, 
that investments by firms in the control group would have evolved from the pre- to the post-
reform period in the same way as investments by firms in the treatment group would have 
done had these firms not been treated.16 
 
Above, we consider the impacts of the dividend tax increase on investments. We also examine 
the corresponding effects on actual dividend distributions. In the specifications above, 
investment variables are replaced with variables measuring dividend payments; all other 
variables and estimation techniques remain the same.  
 
There are also some additional complications that need to be considered. First, the measure of 
how close to the threshold level the dividends are in the pre-reform period can affect the 
incentives to reduce dividends. We therefore examine the robustness of dividend and 
investment regression results to changes in the threshold levels for pre-reform dividends.  
 
Second, and probably most seriously, we need to take into account that the reform was 
common knowledge as of the latter part of 2003, when the government’s tax reform plan was 
published. Even a year before that, in November 2002, an initial blueprint for the reform, 
designed by a group of tax lawyers nominated by the government, was unveiled. This plan 
also included a tightening in the tax treatment of dividends. For these reasons, company 
managers had ample time to plan dividend distributions in advance so as to obtain tax savings 
by distributing relatively more dividends before than after the reform. In Kari et al (2008), we 
indeed find strong empirical support that dividend payments increased in 2003 and 2004 in 
firms that anticipated a tax increase on their dividend distributions after the reform. If we 
simply took the 2003 or 2004 values, we would therefore mistakenly document a strong drop 
                                                        
16 Since we examine a balanced panel where the difference in investment is measured within the same firm, there 
is less need to use the post-reform values of observable variables in matching than would be the case if the data 
came from repeated cross-sections. For an analysis (for a different research topic) where matching combined 
with difference-in-differences is used in the same manner as here, see Huttunen (2007). 
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in dividend behaviour for treated firms after the reform. In order to deal with this problem, the 
pre-reform data is taken from years when the tax bill was unknown. In the basic analysis, we 
use the mean values for 2000-2002, but we also analyse the sensitivity of the results to the 
selected pre-reform years. The year after the reform is 2006, when all the elements of the tax 
reform were in force and the tax rules should have been common knowledge to company 
managers. 
 
Estimation strategy for listed firms 
 
In listed firms, the larger the share of domestic individual owners (continuous treatment), the 
more the effective dividend tax increased. Therefore, the estimated equations take the form 
 
 titititiiti aftershareaftershareXinv ,,,, * eghdba +++++= , 
where share refers to the ownership share of individual domestic owners. Again, the 
coefficient of interest is that of share*after, measuring the impact of the tax increase in 2005. 
The constant term can either be firm-specific or not. If it is not, then the set of control 
variables (X) includes region and industry dummies. In all cases, we control for the size of the 
firm and its profitability. We also check whether the results remain the same if, instead of 
continuous treatment, firms are divided into two groups depending on whether domestic 
individual owners own more than 50% of the firm (treatment group) or not.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
For a preliminary view of what the data is telling us, we compare the pattern of mean 
dividends between the treatment and control groups in the period of 1999–2006 in Figures 5.1 
and 5.2.  
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Figure 5.1    Median dividend in listed corporations 
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Figure 5.2    Median dividend in non-listed corporations 
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This information suggests that the median dividend in the treatment group increased in 2003 
and 2004 compared to the mean dividend in the control group. This is probably a sign of 
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anticipation effects; more about this in Kari et al 2008. However, a more relevant observation 
from this paper’s point of view is a moderate decrease in treatment group dividends compared 
to control group dividends in 2005.  
Table 5.1 provides more information on the mean change in dividends and investments in 
treatment and control firms.17 In non-listed firms, dividends increased in firms in the control 
group, whereas they fell in treated firms. Investments in non-listed firms do not follow any 
clear pattern. In listed firms, dividends increased and investment dropped, but there were no 
systematic differences in these changes between treatment and control firms.  
 
Table 5.1    Comparison of treated and non-treated firms. 
 
a) Non-listed firms 
 ddivid, million € dlogdivid dinv, million € dloginv 
     
non-treated .033929 .4128043 -.0780709 -.1520273 
 (3.073787) (1.007568) (14.02529) (1.783085) 
 [42489] [21081] [43866] [26931] 
treated -.0725417 -.0537045 .0094096 -.3917077 
 (1.002207) (.8754251) (1.378833) (1.525629) 
 [800] [653] [808] [598] 
     
b) Listed firms 
 ddivid, million € dlogdivid dinv, million € dloginv 
     
non-treated 9.388596 .7592586 -6.606392 -.2550419 
 (171.1179) (1.015789) (56.93541) (1.872465) 
 [84] [59] [82] [79] 
     
treated 3.360575 .5090159 -.3964901 -.2230041 
 (14.58871) (.7642247) (4.636289) (1.903146) 
 [37] [25] [34] [34] 
     
Notes: The mean change in dividends  (ddivid), the log of dividends (dlogdivid), investments (dinv) and the log 
of investments (dloginv) in firms facing a tax increase or not. Standard errors in parentheses and the number of 
observations in squared brackets.  
 
5.1 Dividends in non-listed firms 
 
                                                        
17 For expositional purposes, listed firms are also divided here into treatment and control groups, depending on 
whether the main shareholder is a domestic individual owner or not.  
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As argued above, our interest is to examine whether dividends per shareholder were reduced 
below the threshold level of 90,000 euros. Some support for this hypothesis is received from 
Figure 5.2, which plots the distribution of dividends before and after the reform. In the 
interval of 50,000 to 200,000, one can see a peak under the 90,000 threshold (the vertical line) 
where dividends become taxable in 2005. There were no peaks around that dividend level in 
any years before the reform.  
 
Figure 5.2     Distribution of dividends in non-listed firms before and after the tax reform. 
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The actual estimation results concerning the change in the magnitude of all dividends18 paid 
out by non-listed corporations are presented in Table 5.2. We used both dividends directly (in 
millions of euros) and the logarithm of dividends as dependent variables. The estimation 
results of the model specification with a group dummy are presented in columns (1) and (3) 
and the results of the specification with a firm-level dummy in columns (2) and (4). As 
discussed above, our main interest is in the interaction of the group and time variables. This 
interaction variable is called tax increase in our estimation tables. It shows the impact of the 
                                                        
18 In the regressions below, the dependent variable is all dividends paid by the firm instead of dividends to the 
main shareholder. If we used the latter measure, we might document a dividend drop even if total dividends did 
not decrease but the owner directed part of his ‘own’ dividends to other family members. Therefore, our 
dependent variable is closer to the notion of real behavioural changes. We return to this issue in Section 5.3 
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tax increase on the magnitude of the dependent variable - in this case on distributed dividends. 
For every specification, we report the coefficient of the tax increase variable and its robust p 
value. 
 
Table 5.2   Dividend responses in non-listed corporations 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
   Dividends Dividends Log(Div) Log(Div) 
 
tax increase  -0.154  -0.068  -0.301  -0.356 
   (0.044)* (0.181) (0.000)** (0.000)** 
 
time dummy  X  X  X  X 
group dummy  X    X 
firm dummy    X    X 
other ctrl vars X  X  X  X 
 
 
Observations  108213  108213  58999  58999 
R-squared  0.256  0.256  0.655  0.160 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Other control variables include the number 
of employees, turnover, the total value of the balance sheet, the level of 
indebtedness, and profits, and the thirdorder polynomial of all these 
variables, as well as region and industry dummies in specifications without 
a firm-level fixed effect.  
   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, the results regarding dividend distributions are not completely robust. 
However, model (4), where firm-specific variation is reduced with the firm-level dummy 
variable, and dividends are measured in log terms, is probably the most reliable case. 
According to this model, dividends declined in a statistically significant way in firms that 
faced a tax increase. The percentage change – and this is what regression (4) measures – was 
also large in financial terms: more than 30%.  
 
We now proceed to the results from matching combined with differences-in-differences. 
Dividends per total firm assets and the logarithm of dividends are used as dependent 
variables. The tables in Appendix 2 analyse the success of our matching procedures. As 
expected, the treated firms are much bigger in every respect than the control firms before 
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matching, but both the nearest neighbour and the kernel matching methods succeed in 
reducing these differences to a very large extent.19 
 
The estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are reported in Table 5.3. 
We report the coefficient of the treatment effect and the bootstrapped standard errors. The 
coefficient of the ATT is statistically significant in models with logged dividends and 
negative but not so significant in models with dividends in euros as the outcome variable. 
When firms are matched, the results provide some evidence that dividend distributions 
declined in firms that faced a tax increase. In addition, the point estimate also increases, 
suggesting that dividends dropped by roughly 40 per cent in firms whose dividend taxation 
increased. Among the estimators we study, propensity score matching with the outcome 
variable in the first differences probably performs best by eliminating potential biases most 
effectively. 
 
Table 5.3  Dividend responses in non-listed corporations: Matching estimates 
 
 d(Dividends) dLog(Divid) 
 NN Kernel NN Kernel 
ATT 
(std error) 
-0.310 
(0.179) 
-0.215** 
(0.079) 
-0.417** 
(0.091) 
-0.387** 
(0.053) 
Obs 693 37865 570 19395 
 
Results from propensity score matching, dependent variable either the 
change in dividends or the change in the log of dividends. The propensity 
score is estimated with a probit model with the number of employees, 
turnover, the total value of the balance sheet, the level of indebtedness, 
and profits, and the third-order polynomial of all these variables as 
explanatory variables. The common support assumption is invoked. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. The matching method is either  
nearest neighbour or Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.05. 
 
 
In sum, while the results regarding dividend distributions are not entirely robust, it seems that 
reducing the scope for the potential differences between the treated and non-treated firms 
indicates that dividends decreased more in firms that faced higher taxes. 
 
One potential worry in the estimates below is that the results are sensitive to some 
extraordinarily large dividend payouts in pre-reform years (2000-2002), which put some firms 
in the treatment group even if they in some sense should not be there. To examine the 
                                                        
19 Using a somewhat smaller or larger bandwidth did not affect the qualitative results.  
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seriousness of this risk, we determined the treatment status on the basis of mean dividends in 
1998-2002, which reduces the weight given to outlying values from a single year. The results 
remained essentially the same with this modification.20 
 
We also conduct sensitivity analysis in respect of the limit of 90,000 euros. The treatment 
consists of firms whose dividend payments exceeded the threshold before the reform, which 
means that the limit that affected the behaviour of firms might differ from 90,000 euros. In 
addition, the tax reform of 2005 reduced the corporate tax rate from 29 to 26 per cent. In some 
cases, this reduction lowered the total tax burden of a firm even if its dividends exceeded 
90,000 euros. The results of the sensitivity analysis concerning both dividend and investment, 
based on matching methods – since these are our preferred specifications – are reported in 
Appendix 3. The pattern of the results remains broadly the same irrespective of whether the 
treatment group consists of firms whose dividend payments exceeded either 70,000 or 
100,000 euros before the reform. However, the dividend drop appears to be bigger, the higher 
the threshold value used. 
 
5.2  Investment in non-listed firms 
 
We next consider investment responses in non-listed corporations. The models are similar to 
those used in the dividend regressions. Table 5.4 below reports the results of difference-in-
difference estimation. Again, we use both investments per total firm assets and the logarithm 
of investments as dependent variables. The models include either a group dummy or a firm-
level dummy. The control variables are the same as earlier. 
 
Table 5.4 reveals that the estimation results regarding investments are otherwise not 
significant, whereas in model (3), without firm-level fixed effects, the effect of the tax 
increase appears negative and significant. Again, since there is huge variation within the 
firms, the models with a firm-level fixed effect provide more reliable results. According to 
these models (2) and in particular (4), investments did not decline. Thus there is no robust 
evidence that investments declined because of the tax increase. 
 
 
                                                        
20 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 5.4   Investment responses in non-listed corporations 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
   Investment Investment Log(Inv) Log(Inv) 
 
tax increase  0.033  0.224  -0.255  -0.083 
   (0.757) (0.405) (0.000)** (0.192) 
 
time dummy  X  X  X  X 
group dummy  X    X 
firm dummy    X    X 
other ctrl vars X  X  X  X 
 
Observations  108996  108996  71262  71262 
R-squared  0.042  0.048  0.422  0.020 
 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Other control variables include the number 
of employees, turnover, the total value of the balance sheet, the level of 
indebtedness, and profits, and the third-order polynomial of all these 
variables, as well as region and industry dummies in specifications without 
a firm-level fixed effect.  
     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
 
 
The matching models with difference-in-differences concerning investment behaviour are 
estimated similarly as in the case of dividends. The estimates of the average treatment effects 
on the treated (ATT) and bootstrapped standard errors are reported in Table 5.6. When the 
treatment and control groups are made more alike by using matching methods, the results 
regarding investments are all insignificant.21 This conclusion is not dependent on choosing 
matching as the estimation technique. This can be shown if we include all the same control 
variables (and their second and third power) in the regression equation with a firm dummy for 
the sample used in matching and fulfilling the common support assumption. Then the 
specification is as close to the matching set-up as possible, but the estimation is conducted 
with standard linear methods. In this case, the coefficient for the tax increase variable is not 
significant either.  
 
                                                        
21 The sensitivity analysis of investment matching models in respect of the threshold level that divides firms into 
treatment and control groups, reported in Appendix 3, comes to the same conclusion. In addition, the lengthening 
of the pre-reform period to cover years from 1998-2002 does not affect the results (similarly as for dividends.) 
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All in all, the results concerning investment responses in non-listed corporations tend to 
suggest that investments are relatively inflexible, and they do not on the whole react to tax 
changes.  
 
Table 5.3  Investment responses in non-listed corporations: Matching estimates  
 
 d(Investment) dLog(Inv) 
 NN Kernel NN Kernel 
ATT 
(std error) 
0.339 
(0.444) 
0.101 
(0.144) 
-0.050 
(0.121) 
-0.017 
(0.065) 
Obs 697 38365 562 25358 
 
Results from propensity score matching, dependent variable either the 
change in investment or the change in the log of investment. The propensity 
score is estimated with a probit model with the number of employees, 
turnover, the total value of the balance sheet, the level of indebtedness, 
and profits, and the third-order polynomial of all these variables as 
explanatory variables. The common support assumption is invoked. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. The matching method is either 
nearest neighbour or Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.05. 
 
5.3 An additional margin: changes in ownership 
 
Since the 90,000 euro threshold is defined per person, owners of family firms could 
potentially also influence their tax payments by spreading their ownership within their family. 
We examine this using similar regression techniques as above, but with the ownership share 
of the main owner as the dependent variable.22 The hypothesis then is that owners whose 
dividends were large before the reform have a stronger incentive to reduce their own 
ownership and distribute it to e.g. their children. The results (not reported here for the sake of 
space) reveal that the sign of the tax increase variable is indeed negative, but it is not 
statistically significant. Owners might have thus lowered their tax burden by other means than 
simply cutting dividends. In any case, the measured dividend drop above represents a real 
decrease in dividends since the dependent variable was all dividends paid by the firm.  
 
5.4   Results for listed firms 
 
The impact of the tax increase faced by listed firms on the magnitude of dividends and 
investments is analysed using the same simple difference-in-difference estimation strategy as 
in the case of non-listed firms. As earlier, we have two model specifications: one with a group 
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dummy and another with a firm dummy. Again, we used both dividends (investments) per 
total firm assets and the logarithm of dividends (investments) as dependent variables. 
 
Our main interest is in the interaction between the proportional share of domestic individual 
ownership and time variables.23 In the case of listed firms, this measures the impact of the tax 
increase in 2005. This is the variable tax increase in the estimation tables. We used the same 
sets of control variables as in the previous analyses. The proportional share of ownership by 
domestic individuals (dom ownership)is an additional control variable in specifications 
without a firm-level fixed effect. 
 
Table 5.7   Dividend responses in listed corporations 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  
   Dividends Dividends Log(Div) Log(Div) 
 
tax increase  -15.135 -47.373 -0.484  -1.158 
   (0.612) (0.087) (0.513) (0.024)* 
 
time dummy  X  X  X  X 
dom ownership  X    X 
firm dummy    X    X 
other ctrl vars X  X  X  X 
 
Observations  189  189  124  124 
R-squared  0.671  0.349  0.806  0.625 
 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Other control variables include turnover, 
profitability and employment as well as region and industry dummies in 
specs without a firm-level fixed effect. 
     
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
 
The estimation results regarding dividends (Table 5.7) mostly suggest that dividends in listed 
companies did not drop more in firms that experienced a tax increase. The results across 
specifications regarding investment (Table 5.8) indicate that investments did not change in 
response to the tax reform. We conclude that listed firms did not change their dividend or 
investment policy even when they faced fairly high tax increases. This implies that taxation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 The data set does not contain a more direct measure of ownership within the family. 
23 We also categorised the share of ownership variable by dummy variables and used it and their interactions 
with the time variable in the estimation models. However, this did not change the results.  
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has only a minor impact on the financing decisions of listed firms or that it takes longer for 
the effects of the tax increase to materialise. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.8   Investment responses in listed corporations 
 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
   Investment Investment Log(Inv) Log(Inv) 
 
tax increase  -13.063 -3.569  -0.349  0.215 
   (0.134) (0.582) (0.649) (0.733) 
 
time dummy  X  X  X  X 
dom ownership  X    X 
firm dummy    X    X 
other ctrl vars X  X  X  X 
 
Observations  186  186  135  139 
R-squared  0.747  0.236  0.782  0.384 
 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Other control variables include turnover, 
profitability, employment and indebtedness as well as region and industry 
dummies in specs without a firm-level fixed effect. 
     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines how dividend distributions and investments in Finnish corporations 
reacted to the 2005 corporate and capital income tax reform. Since the reform treated different 
types of corporations differently, it involved exogenous variations to their tax treatment, 
offering an opportunity for promising empirical estimates. In addition, as the vast majority of 
our data comes from non-listed companies, the analysis is not blurred – at least to a large 
extent – by concerns of asymmetric information between owners and managers.  
 
Our results indicate that dividend distribution declined somewhat after the reform. Since there 
were large anticipatory increases in dividend distributions before the reform, this drop can 
also be a reaction to these earlier, abnormally large dividend distributions. This part of the 
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results therefore serves as further confirmation of the results by Korinek and Stiglitz (2009): 
anticipated tax changes lead to large impact on the timing of dividends. Since dividends can 
be altered due to intertemporal tax planning also under the new view, the drop in dividend 
distribution is compatible both with the old and the new view of dividend taxation.  
 
The results regarding investment do not indicate that investments declined more in firms that 
were subject to a dividend tax increase. While this result must be interpreted cautiously 
because our data covers a relatively short period (two years) after the reform, it is perhaps 
more in line with the new rather than the old view of dividend taxation. Since the reform was 
also known roughly two years in advance, the ‘effective’ reaction time for investment 
decisions that we measure covers approximately four years, thus increasing the likelihood that 
at least part of the long-term reactions are captured.  
 
Another possibility is that firms suffer from liquidity constraints, and thus have lower 
investment activity after paying extraordinarily high dividends in the years before the reform, 
but on average this does not appear to be the case either for firms in our data set. However, 
because the dividend tax hike in the Finnish case hit mature firms which were able to pay 
large dividends even before the reform, this reform does not open up the best possibility to 
examine the link between liquidity constraints and investments. And of course, even if this 
dividend tax did not affect the investment of (mature) firms, a different kind of dividend tax 
increase (which would also be faced by firms that are more likely to be young, growing firms) 
could have different impacts.  
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APPENDIX 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NON-LISTED FIRMS      
      
Dividends* 129255 .0853564 2.280798 0 600 
Investment* 134138 .2084316 8.528886 0 2813.623 
Turnover* 139520 3.403713 53.85463 0 11512.61 
Nr of personnel 138899 21.11148 150.0728 0 16842 
Balance sheet* 139451 6.614561 161.4212 .1288697 45093.78 
Profit* 137436 -.6361726 301.3087 -111680.5 1743.529 
Debt* 139397 2.519004 103.8281 -12.97514 26640.72 
Net assets* 135867 1.263971 18.34198 -519.2112 2593.67 
      
LISTED FIRMS      
      
Dividends* 267 45.31508 270.1771 0 4000 
Investment* 257 13.91131 48.83482 .0009984 399.1752 
Turnover* 241 306.6733 2138.952 .0035297 32212.98 
Nr of personnel 267 745.6617 2233.524 1 28466 
Balance sheet* 267 2152.083 15649.07 .2792644 248238.4 
Profit* 228 31.70876 193.7652 -116.2483 2517.52 
Debt* 267 828.0427 7348.071 0 117681 
Domestic, individ owners 209 .3683637 .2867675 .0013 .9612 
      
 
Note: Variables denoted by * are expressed in millions of EUR. 
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APPENDIX 2: Comparison of unmatched and matched firms in the treatment and control 
groups 
 
a) Nearest neighbour matching 
  Mean  %reduct t-test 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t    p>t 
      
turnover Unmatched 12.934    3.348 31.1  7.02  0.000 
 Matched 12.934   14.722 -5.8 81.4 -1.34  0.180 
      
balance Unmatched 21.628   5.3637 25.9  5.41  0.000 
statement Matched 21.628    24.05 -3.9 85.1 -1.07  0.284 
      
nr of  Unmatched 85.08   24.169 29.7  12.37  0.000 
personnel Matched 85.08   95.101 -4.9 83.5 -0.81  0.421 
      
profits Unmatched .97924  -2.8961 0.9  0.18  0.860 
 Matched .97924   1.0042 0 99.4 -0.33  0.739 
      
debt Unmatched 4.374    2.367 2  0.37  0.710 
 Matched 4.374   4.8416 -0.5 76.7 -0.70  0.483 
 
b) Kernel matching 
      
  Mean  %reduct t-test 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t    p>t 
      
turnover Unmatched 12.934    3.348 31.1  7.02  0.000 
 Matched 12.934   14.531 -5.2 83.3 -1.12  0.261 
      
balance Unmatched 21.628   5.3637 25.9  5.41  0.000 
statement Matched 21.628   23.458 -2.9 88.7 -0.78  0.438 
      
nr of  Unmatched 85.08   24.169 29.7  12.37  0.000 
personnel Matched 85.08    87.47 -1.2 96.1 -0.20  0.841 
      
profits Unmatched .97924  -2.8961 0.9  0.18  0.860 
 Matched .97924    .7661 0.1 94.5 0.04  0.968 
      
debt Unmatched 4.374    2.367 2  0.37  0.710 
 Matched 4.374    4.927 -0.5 72.4 -0.38  0.705 
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 APPENDIX 3: Sensitivity analysis using matching with difference-in-differences 
Dividend responses in non-listed corporations, dividend limit 70,000 euros 
 
 d(Dividends) dLog(Divid) 
 NN Kernel NN Kernel 
ATT 
(std error) 
-.074 
(0.106) 
-.144* 
(0.074) 
-.357** 
(0.065) 
-.345** 
(0.046) 
Obs 879 37865 718 19395 
 
Dividend responses in non-listed corporations, dividend limit 100,000 euros 
 
 d(Dividends) dLog(Divid) 
 NN Kernel NN Kernel 
ATT 
(std error) 
-0.351* 
(0.156) 
-.289** 
(0.089) 
-0.480** 
(0.087 
-.403** 
(0.055) 
Obs 562 37865 460 19395 
 
 
Investment responses in non-listed corporations, dividend limit 70,000 euros 
 d(Investment) dLog(Inv) 
 NN Kernel NN Kernel 
ATT 
(std error) 
-.057 
(0.073) 
.064 
(0.307) 
-0.050 
(0.121) 
-0.017 
(0.065) 
Obs 883 38365 562 25358 
 
Investment responses in non-listed corporations, dividend limit 100,000 euros 
 d(Investment) dLog(Inv) 
 NN Kernel NN Kernel 
ATT 
(std error) 
-.0988 
(0.106) 
.206 
(0.352) 
.095 
(0.113) 
.022 
(0.084) 
Obs 565 38365 461 25358 
 
 
